In a blog post written a while back, I mentioned that the number of SEC actions and monetary sanctions seemed drastically lower than in past years. These statistics are closely tracked and followed by the public and Congress and are generally considered a measure of the Enforcement Division’s effectiveness and productivity. In the same blog post I further suggested that SEC leadership would realize the negative political consequences that could result from a sharp decline in Enforcement statistics and therefore would likely make a concerted effort to push cases forward to improve its statistics before its fiscal year end.
I was definitely correct about the Enforcement statistics being way down but now admit that I was likely wrong to suggest that there would be a turnaround. If you regularly visit the SEC’s website you will see the obvious: that the Commission has not filed many Enforcement actions in the recent weeks and months. Last week, the number of actions slowed to a mere trickle, none of which were particularly notable or newsworthy. At this point in time, with only a handful of months left in the fiscal year, including the notoriously slow summer months, it is almost impossible to make up for the shortfall. If that isn’t enough evidence, the recent speeches by Commissioners Piwowar and Peirce and the Congressional testimony of the Enforcement co-heads show clearly that these SEC executives expect that the number of SEC actions and monetary sanctions will be much lower than in the past. Here is a sample of paraphrased statements that SEC leaders made recently:
- We don’t judge our effectiveness in simplistic metrics such as the raw number of enforcement actions or total fines and disgorgements;
- We have finite resources;
- Some of the cases filed in the past were not significant;
- Raw numbers are not the measure of our success;
- We are spending our scarce resources going after individuals;
- Pursuing individuals likely has an impact on the total number of enforcement actions we can bring in any given period;
- The Supreme Court has made it difficult to collect monies from long ago; and
- We are no longer measuring success by tallying up enforcement statistics.
So, statistics will be down, no doubt about it, and SEC senior management has all but conceded the inevitable. They are now hard at work justifying the outcome before it becomes official. An important question is what on earth has caused the drastic decline in SEC monetary sanctions and actions.
Maybe, as Enforcement co-head Steve Pieken claimed in a recent speech, the Enforcement Division is actually redoubling its efforts to pursue individual charges in each investigation. If this was indeed a change in policy, it could certainly consume more staff resources and result in fewer enforcement cases filed. I don’t think that is the situation though. The Commission has for many years directed SEC staff to look long and hard at potential individual misconduct in its investigations and many securities law violations actually require some sort of individual culpability as a mater of law. Moreover, if this Commission were in fact filing more cases against individuals than in past years, such actions would be well publicized. That hasn’t been the case and, in fact, one of the enforcement actions involving potential individual misconduct that SEC officials regularly highlight is the litigated case against Rio Tinto and two of its former senior officers, which, as I suggested before, has some major shortcomings, particularly with respect to the allegations against the individuals.
Another possibility is that Commissioners Piwowar and Peirce are gumming up the works somehow. In reading their recent speeches, it’s obvious that they don’t have much interest in SEC Enforcement actions, beyond those involving quasi criminal types of behavior. They both also happen to have some peculiar views on a variety of SEC Enforcement topics, with Piwowar recently proclaiming in a speech that his initial reaction to every Enforcement action he sees is “No” and, if the proposed action involves corporate penalties, he has typically started and ended up with “Hell No.” No doubt aware of his subtle irony, in the same speech he contended that he understood the ethical requirements he followed as a Commissioner “to mean that [h]e cannot allow public outcry, agency morale, politics, or jurisdictional turf battles to be reasons for pursuing, or not pursuing, an enforcement action.”
For her part, Commissioner Peirce has attempted to excuse her extreme anti-enforcement attitude in numerous ways, explaining her votes against enforcement actions as principled decisions. Among other things, she cites concerns about adequate “due process” accorded defendants subject to Enforcement actions and worries that, if corporate entities pay SEC fines, shareholders of those corporations will end up paying twice for corporate wrongdoing.
I have to confess it’s difficult to understand her due process concerns, particularly since the SEC affords nearly every potential defendant seemingly endless opportunities to defend themselves and many lawyers in the securities defense bar tend to be quite sophisticated. Do potential defendants need more meetings with staff and the Directors of Enforcement? More white papers or wells submissions? I suspect most defense attorneys would say “of course, yes please,” while suppressing a chuckle. Perhaps her due process concerns would be easier to follow if she added a little more analytical substance to buttress them. Or perhaps she is using the phrase due process to mean something other than its traditional legal meaning.
I also confess that I ran the numbers a few times, read and reread her example, and still could not understand Peirce’s claim that corporate shareholders end up paying twice for corporate wrongdoing if the SEC fines the corporation. Though other Republican Commissioners (including Commissioner Piwowar) have repeated the same claim, so far none has been able to convince any serious person that that actually occurs. Maybe some rigorous economic analysis or better examples would better illuminate this proposition. Or maybe she is using the word “pay” to mean something other than what it usually means.
All this being said, I doubt seriously that Commissioners Piwowar and Peirce bear a significant portion of the blame for the scarcity of Enforcement actions After all, they are just two of five Commissioners and cannot really make policy on their own or even together. They can certainly make life more difficult and unenjoyable for Enforcement staff, but realistically they don’t have much say unless other Commissioners are recused from a particular enforcement matter, hopefully a rare situation. Generally speaking, these two Commissioners don’t get to decide which Enforcement cases get brought before the Commission for a vote.
The individual that generally can decide which Enforcement cases are brought before the Commission to approve is the Enforcement Director, or as it now stands, the Enforcement co-Directors. I believe that the current co-Directors of Enforcement bear a large measure of the responsibility for the shortfall in Enforcement cases. It falls to them to operate the Division productively and to move cases effectively through the approval process maze. With the Enforcement Division now led by two seemingly competent Directors (rather than one, as has historically been the case) a reasonable person would expect to see more, not less, Enforcement actions filed than in those periods in which there was just one Director.
Most prior Enforcement Directors have seemed to have really enjoyed the position as well as the people working in the Enforcement Division and all seemed quite fond of the status and power that the position provides. Prior directors usually worked extremely long hours, including many late nights and most weekends. I suspect that the current co-Directors have similar work habits and attitudes, otherwise they wouldn’t have gotten the jobs. It seems, however, that, for some reason, fewer enforcement cases are making it to a Commission vote, which suggests that something is amiss within the Enforcement Division. Either the process of completing a case has slowed for some reason or legitimate cases are being stymied or killed.
By this juncture, more than a year into their jobs, the co-Directors should have shed their defense lawyer skins and should be relatively comfortable with the job demands. They should have a good handle on the skill sets of a wide swath of their subordinates. They should know which supervisors in the Division they can count on to bring the high profile and challenging cases and which individuals they can trust and rely on to make sound decisions. They should know which litigators have the skill sets and aptitude for trial and which are best working on litigation motions or even less intensive projects. They should know which decisions are worth spending scarce time on and which are not and should be quite comfortable making independent decisions that involve some risk. Perhaps most importantly, they should be exceptionally effective in advocating on behalf of the Division and investors. If they have not yet become proficient in the director role and all that it involves, they may never be able to get there, and perhaps should start contemplating a return to the private sector, knowing that they have at least gained highly sought after experience that should significantly enhance their earnings power.